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Abstract
We propose a blueprint for an international emission permit market such as the
EU trading scheme. Each country decides on the amount of permits it wants to
oﬀer. A fraction of these permits is grandfathered, the remainder is auctioned.
Revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to mem-
ber countries in ﬁxed proportions. We show that international permit markets
with refunding lead to outcomes in which all countries tighten the issuance of
permits and are better oﬀ compared to standard international permit markets. If
the share of grandfathered permits is suﬃciently small, we obtain approximately
socially optimal emission reductions.
Keywords: climate change mitigation, global refunding scheme, international
permit markets, international agreements, tradeable permits
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Since 2005 the EU has been operating a greenhouse gas emission trading system among
its member countries that involves large energy-intensive industries. It is expected that
the emission trading system will be progressively broadened and also that emission
permits will be auctioned to some degree.1 The key issue in such an international
trading system for emission allowances is to motivate member countries to reduce the
amount of permits granted to domestic ﬁrms, thus causing them to abate more. As has
been observed for the EU trading system, countries tend to issue permits generously to
their domestic industries, often following business-as-usual scenarios (see, e.g., Carbone
et al. 2008).
In this paper we propose a simple blueprint for an emission trading scheme with re-
funding that provides countries with incentives to considerably tighten the issuance of
permits compared to a decentralized solution. The scheme works as follows: Member
countries can participate in an international emission permit market operated by an
administering central agency (henceforth CA). Each country decides individually how
many emission permits it wants to oﬀer. Some fraction of these permits is grandfa-
thered to domestic ﬁrms, the rest is auctioned by the CA. The central idea of the
refunding scheme is that revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and
(partly) reimbursed to participating countries. Each country receives a ﬁxed share of
total reimbursements per period The share is negotiated before the global refunding
scheme starts operating.
Refunding of auctioned permits greatly reduces the incentives of governments to issue
excessively generous permits to domestic producers. Without refunding, the issuance
of a larger amount of permits creates large beneﬁts, as domestic producers have to
buy fewer permits or additional revenues are generated from the sale of permits. The
associated increase of environmental damages caused by lower permit prices are shared
among all countries. With refunding, the beneﬁts accruing to a country by increasing
the amount of permits are greatly reduced, as each country only receives a ﬁxed share
of the revenues from the total amount of auctioned permits. Environmental damages
increase in the same way as without refunding. This produces incentives for all countries
to tighten the issuance of emission permits.
1Detailed discussions and assessments of the European Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System
can be found in Sterner and Müller (2008) and Böhringer et al. (2005).
1We develop a simple multi-period model of international permit markets with refunding
as described above. Our main analytical results are as follows: We show that there exists
a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game, in which countries choose the
schedule of permit issuance across all periods and the CA administers the auction
of permits and the refunding of auctioning revenues. In equilibrium, all countries are
better oﬀ compared to an international permit market without refunding. If the amount
of grandfathered permits tends to zero then the equilibrium tends to the global social
optimum.
The scheme we propose may help to ease political constraints. In particular, allowing
for a mixture of auctioned and grandfathered permits balances the need to tighten
emission caps and the desire of countries not to put domestic ﬁrms at a disadvantage
over and against their foreign competitors. If these competitors are headquartered in
countries that do not participate in the trading scheme, the fear is often particularly
strong that a country doing its bit for the environment will lose investments and jobs.2
Our proposed scheme might help to reduce this fear, as it can be designed in a way
that makes all participating countries better oﬀ.
The paper is organized as follows: We start by relating our paper to the literature (Sec-
tion 2). In Section 3 we introduce the global economy and international permit markets.
In Section 4 we derive the socially optimal and decentralized solutions, which are the
benchmarks for the analysis of the permit trading scheme with refunding, introduced in
Section 5. In Sections 6 and 7 we show that the permit trading scheme with refunding
can always implement a Pareto improvement compared to the decentralized solution
and that, in particular cases, the social global optimum is achievable. In Section 8 we
discuss some of our model assumptions. Section 9 concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
Our paper draws on three strands of literature. First, there is a large body of literature
addressing the underprovision of international pollution control. At the practical level,
the Kyoto Protocol – the ﬁrst signiﬁcant international eﬀort to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions – has been criticized as ineﬀective (see, e.g., Böhringer and Vogt 2003,
2Politicians have proposed imposing a “carbon tariﬀ” on imports from countries that do not partic-
ipate in international treaties on climate change in order to shelter domestic industries (see Economist
2008).
2Nordhaus and Boyer 1999, Schelling 2002, McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002, and Barrett
2003). As a consequence, various other approaches to international coordination have
been suggested. Aldy et al. (2003) summarize these alternatives, which include an
international carbon tax and international technology standards. Gersbach and Winkler
(2007) have designed a global refunding scheme in which each country determines its
own emission tax, while part of the aggregate tax revenues is refunded to members in
proportion to the relative emission reductions they achieve within a given period.
In this paper we design a global refunding scheme for emission permit markets. Un-
like emission taxes, which may diﬀer across countries, an international permit market
imposes a global carbon price on all countries. Hence a country’s decision to reduce
the amount of grandfathered permits for its domestic industries will increase the car-
bon price for all countries, causing them to abate more and simultaneously increase
the revenues from the permit auction, which will be refunded to all countries. These
externalities are absent when countries choose national emission taxes, and they also
allow for a simple refunding scheme for international permit markets that makes all
countries better oﬀ compared to the decentralized approach.
Second, ever since Montgomery (1972) showed that initial permit allocation schemes
may be irrelevant for emission abatement, there has been an ongoing debate about
whether free allocation of permits (grandfathering) or auctioning of permits is the
superior form of permit allocation (see Requate 2005 and MacKenzie 2008 for surveys
of this literature). We suggest that a mixture of grandfathered and auctioned permits,
coupled with refunding, can provide appropriate incentives for countries to choose caps
in an international climate agreement.
Third, our investigation is part of a recent body of literature on international emission
trading. Chichilnisky et al. (2000) show that emission markets will allocate resources
eﬃciently if and only if international transfers are made in order to equalize social
marginal utilities of consumption. Caplan et al. (2003) show that eﬃcient allocation
obtains when autonomous regional governments choose their own emission levels in
anticipation of interregional resource transfers operated by an altruistic international
agency. Without international transfers permit trade can still yield substantial emis-
sions reductions, as countries take account of the fact that they inﬂuence permit prices
when they select their abatement target (Helm 2003) and general equilibrium feedback
eﬀects, such as carbon leakages and trade spillovers, may alter a country’s incentive
to restrict its own emissions (Carbone et al. 2008). We design an international scheme
3for controlling global pollution in which revenues from auctioning permits are collected
and redistributed to member countries in ﬁxed proportions.
3 The Model
We consider a dynamic model of a global economy with pollutive emissions consisting of
n countries indexed by i = 1,...,n. Time spans T < ∞ periods indexed by t = 1,...,T.
3.1 The economy
Emissions of country i in period t are assumed to equal business-as-usual emissions











i] , i = 1,...,n , t = 1,...,T . (1)
We assume these emissions are caused by a representative ﬁrm in each country which











￿2 , φi > 0 , i = 1,...,n , t = 1,...,T . (2)
Countries may diﬀer in their abatement cost parameters φi. For ease of presentation,
we introduce the abbreviations Φ for the sum of the abatement cost parameters and E









In period t, global emissions, which are the sum of the emissions of all countries, increase
a pollution stock, st, according to the following equation of motion:






t) , γ ∈ [0,1] , t = 1,...,T , (4)
where γ denotes the constant decay rate of the pollution stock. The emissions accumu-
late the pollution stock instantaneously. The polar case γ = 1 represents the pure ﬂow
pollutant problem.
3This is a standard short cut for capturing the aggregate abatement costs of a country (see, e.g.,
Falk and Mendelsohn 1993).








t , βi > 0 , i = 1,...,n , t = 1,...,T . (5)
Countries may diﬀer in their damage parameters βi. For later use, we introduce the




βi , ¯ β = B/n . (6)
Finally, countries are assumed to discount outcomes in period t with the discount factor
δt−1 where δ ≤ 1.
3.2 International permit markets
All countries have access to an international permit market where emission permits
valid for one period are traded. In each period, all countries individually decide about
the amount of emission permits, ei − ǫi
t, they issue. Here ǫi
t denotes the reduction in
emission permits of country i in period t compared to the business-as-usual emissions
ei. Of these permits the fraction   ∈ [0,1) is grandfathered to the representative ﬁrm.4
We impose that ǫi
t ≥ 0 for all i = 1,...,n and t = 1,...,T. Thus countries are not
allowed to issue more permits than the business-as-usual emissions. We note that ǫi
t
may exceed ei, which means that a country reduces the amount of permits in the world
by buying permits higher than the emissions produced.
Firms in all countries need (at least) emission permits amounting to net emissions
ei−ai
t per period. As ﬁrms receive the grandfathered emission permits of their country,
country i oﬀers emission permits amounting to ei − ai
t −  (ei − ǫi
t) in the market.
All permits are traded on the international permit market at price pt in each period.




t). Cost-minimizing behavior of the representative ﬁrm in each







t = φipt , i = 1,...,n , t = 1,...,T . (7)
4As is well known from the literature (see Montgomery 1972), the fraction µ has no eﬀect on
the equilibrium permit price and the permit allocation in the decentralized solution, as discussed in
Section 4.2. However, µ inﬂuences both the permit price and the permit allocation in the case of a
refunding scheme. We shall discuss this point in Sections 6 and 7.























, t = 1,...,T . (9)
Equation (9) allows us to express emissions Ei, abatement costs Ci, and the pollution
stocks st in terms of the permit price pt:
E
i(pt) = e







t , i = 1,...,n , t = 1,...,T , (11)
st(pt) = (1 − γ)st−1 + E − Φpt , t = 1,...,T . (12)
4 Social Optimum and Decentralization
In this section we characterize the global social optimum and the decentralized solution,
which will serve as benchmarks for the discussion of the permit markets with refunding.
All results derived hold for any γ ∈ [0,1] and T < ∞. To sharpen the intuition, we
provide closed form solutions for the equilibrium prices pt and the stocks of greenhouse
gases st for the case of a ﬂow pollutant (γ = 1).
4.1 Global social optimum
We start with the social global optimum. Consider a global social planner seeking to
minimize the net present value of the global total costs consisting of global costs of
emission abatement and the sum of national environmental damages stemming from





















subject to equation (12).




























t denotes the Langrange multiplier or shadow price of the pollution stock st












k−tsk , t = 1,...,T . (15b)
As the Lagrangian is strictly convex, the necessary conditions are also suﬃcient and





k−t sk , t = 1,...,T . (16)
The following proposition states the optimal permit prices p⋆
t and the corresponding
pollution stocks s⋆
t:
Proposition 1 (Global Social Optimum)
Given the optimization problem (13), the optimal emission permit prices p⋆
t and optimal
pollution stocks s⋆
t are given by the unique solution of the following system of linear






















































The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix.




t. Hence, for the global social optimum, only the sum of all ǫi
t is
determined but not the distribution among the countries. However, the abatement
eﬀorts of each country are uniquely determined by virtue of equation (7). To ensure
that these are feasible, we assume for the remainder of the paper
7Assumption 1






t denotes the permit price in the global social optimum.
Throughout the paper, permit prices will never exceed the permit prices in the social
global optimum p⋆
t. This assures that abatement levels as determined by equation (7)
are always feasible.
4.2 Decentralized solution
Next we examine a decentralized system where a local planner in each country (e.g.,
a government) seeks to minimize total local costs consisting of local abatement costs
and local environmental damages. Each country chooses its own sequence of emission
permit reductions, taking the actions of other countries as given. We are looking for



































subject to equations (9), (12) and ǫi
t ≥ 0, t = 1,...,T.
Denoting the shadow price of the pollution stock st in period t by λiDS






























We see that the Lagrangian is independent of  , the fraction of emission permits grand-
fathered to ﬁrms in each period, which is a reﬂection of the well-known ﬁnding that
auctioning and grandfathering induce the same abatement eﬀorts.
Analogously to Section 4.1, the necessary conditions, which due to the strict convexity



















k−tsk , t = 1,...,T . (22b)
8Thus we derive the following reaction function for country i in period t:
ǫ
i








, t = 1,...,T . (23)
The set of conditions (23) for all countries i and all periods t determines the subgame
perfect equilibrium. For the permit price pt summing over all n countries and using
Pn
i=1 ǫi
t = Φpt yields




k−tsk , t = 1,...,T . (24)








βi − ¯ β
¯ β
￿
Φpt , i = 1,...,n , t = 1,...,T . (25)
For the remainder of the paper we impose the following assumption that assures that
ǫi
t ≥ 0 for all i = 1,...,n and t = 1,...,T in the decentralized solution.
Assumption 2
For all countries i = 1,...,n the following condition holds:







Thus we do not need to check explicitly for the non-negativity of all ǫi
t (i = 1,...,n; t =
1,...,T), and equations (24) and (25) determine the Nash equilibrium given by the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Decentralized Solution)
There exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (ˆ pt,ˆ ǫi
t,ˆ st) of the decentralized
solution given by the unique solution of the following system of linear equations (i =

































βi − ¯ β
¯ β
￿
Φˆ pt , (27b)





t−k(E − Φˆ pk) . (27c)
9For γ = 1 we derive for ˆ pt, ˆ st and ˆ ǫi
t (i = 1,...,n)
ˆ pt =
¯ βE
1 + ¯ βΦ
, ˆ st =
E






βi − ¯ β
¯ β
￿ ¯ βE
1 + ¯ βΦ
. (28)
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix.
In the decentralized solution, all countries only account for local damages. As a con-
sequence, the optimal abatement levels and permit prices are lower and the optimal
pollution stocks are higher compared to the global social optimum. Moreover, a coun-
try chooses higher emission permit reductions in the decentralized solution the higher
φi is (i.e., the lower abatement costs are) and the higher βi is (i.e., the higher envi-
ronmental damage is). In line with Helm (2003), countries exhibiting above-average
environmental damage buy permits, while countries with below-average environmental
damage sell permits, independently of the level of their abatement costs. Note that no
active trading occurs if countries are homogeneous with respect to marginal damages
(i.e., βi = ¯ β, ∀i = 1,...,n), as in this case all countries issue emission permits equal
to their net emissions.
5 Permit Markets with Refunding
In the following we introduce a refunding scheme and analyze its potential for improv-
ing on the decentralized solution. The essential idea is that aggregate revenues from
auctioning permits are refunded to member countries in ﬁxed proportions.
5.1 Institutional set-up
We consider a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, the n countries negotiate the
fraction   of grandfathered emission permits and the fractions ρi
t that each country
receives from the aggregate auctioning revenues in each period. The relative refunding
shares ρi
t may depend on time. In the second step, the central agency (CA) handles
the transactions on the permit market, collects the revenues and redistributes them to
member countries. In each period t, the CA decides on the absolute total refunds by
choosing a fraction αt of the auction revenues to be redistributed to the countries. The
CA seeks to set αt such that in each period the permit price is as close as possible to
10the permit price in social global optimum.5 If αt < 1, i.e., not all auctioning revenues
are redistributed to member countries, the remaining revenues are transferred to the
next period.
In each period t = 1,...,T, the CA ﬁrst announces the refunding share αt. Then
countries choose emission permit reductions ǫi
t, and permit trading takes place. Finally,
the CA refunds the revenues to the member countries.
5.2 Reaction functions and equilibrium price
By virtue of equation (9), the total amount of auctioned emission permits per period
can be written as
Pt = (1 −  )(E − Φpt) , t = 1 ...,T , (29)
and the total revenues from auctioning in period t equal
Rt = ptPt = pt(1 −  )(E − Φpt) , t = 1,...,T . (30)
Rt is a concave quadratic function of pt exhibiting a maximum at pt = E
2Φ. We focus
on the case where revenues Rt are an increasing function of the permit price pt. Thus
we impose the following assumption for the remainder of the paper:
Assumption 3
For all periods t = 1,...,T the following condition holds:
E − 2Φip
⋆
t > 0 , (31)
where p⋆
t denotes the permit price in the global social optimum.
Condition (31) also implies that total abatement in the global social optimum in each
period is lower than half of the total business-as-usual emissions E.
The absolute refund ri











t = 1 for all t = 1...,T. Given  , ρi
t, αt and the choices of all other
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5We exclude the possibility that the CA can commit to an entire path {αt}
T
t=1 of refunding shares
in period t = 1.
11subject to equations (9), (12), (32) and ǫi
t ≥ 0, t = 1,...,T.
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t denotes the Lagrange multiplier or shadow price of the pollution stock st.






























t−1βist + (1 − γ)λ
iREF
t+1 . (35b)
If the Lagrangian (34) is jointly convex in all ǫi
t and st, these necessary conditions are
also suﬃcient for a best response of country i in each period. Convexity, however, is not
guaranteed but depends, in particular, on the distribution parameters ρi
t and αt. The
following proposition gives the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the Lagrangian
(34) to be convex.
Proposition 3 (Convexity of the Lagrangian)
The Lagrangian (34) is jointly convex in all ǫi
t and st if and only if the following
condition holds for all i = 1,...,n and t = 1,...,T:





− 2  . (36)
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix.
If condition (36) holds, the reaction function for each country i = 1,...,n and for each






























k=t [δ(1 − γ)]
k−tsk − E
Φ(1 −  )(1 − αt)
 (n + 1) + 2(1 −  )αt − 1
, t = 1,...,T . (38)
12We note that the reaction functions as constructed in equation (37) take into account
that changes in the permit issuance of one country in one period impacts on the permit
issuance of all other countries and its own reaction in future periods. This impact works
through changes in the future pollution stock and associated changes in future permit
prices. Hence the reaction functions (37) enable us to construct subgame perfect Nash
equilibria.
6 No Grandfathered Permits
In this section we examine the polar case where all permits are auctioned. This case is
the most telling illustration of the virtues of the refunding scheme.
6.1 Welfare



























For   = 0, the reaction function (37) is independent of ǫi
t. As a consequence, the Nash
equilibrium is unique only with respect to the permit price pt but not with respect to
the distribution of the emission permit reductions ǫi
t. We observe that equation (39b)
becomes identical to equation (16), the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a global
social optimum, if and only if αt = 1. If we insert αt = 1 and pt = p⋆
t back into
equation (39a) and take into account that βi
PT




t by virtue of
equation (16), we ﬁnd that for both equations (39a) and (39b) to hold simultaneously
the relative refunds ρi













, i = 1,...,n , t = 1,...,T . (40)
Thus, if the relative refunding rule ρi
t is given by equation (40) and the CA sets αt = 1
for all t = 1,...,T, the permit price p⋆
t of the social global optimum is implemented as
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes
this result:
13Proposition 4 (Refunding without Grandfathered Permits)
For αt = 1 and ρi
t, as given by equation (40), the socially optimal permit prices p⋆
t
and pollution stocks s⋆
t as given by Proposition 1 are supported as the unique subgame







holds for all i = 1,...,n and t = 1,...,T.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the Appendix. Note that uniqueness refers to the
permit prices, pollution stocks and abatement levels but not to individual countries’
permit reductions, which are indeterminate.
Proposition 4 says that if αt = 1 and ρi
t is as given by equation (40), the social opti-
mum can be implemented as a decentralized outcome by enacting a refunding scheme.
Condition (41) and equation (40) impose constraints on the degree of heterogeneity
between countries. A direct corollary of Proposition 4 is
Corollary 1 (Homogeneous Countries)
If countries are homogeneous, condition (41) is always fulﬁlled.
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in the Appendix.
The intriguing insight from Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 is that collecting the revenues
from auctioning permits and refunding them in ﬁxed proportions can overcome the
global public good problem associated with the decentralized solution. The intuition
in the homogeneous case where ρi
t = 1
n (i = 1,...,n; t = 1,...,t) is as follows:
Suppose that n − 1 countries choose ǫi
t = ei − φip⋆
t. In the decentralized solution
without refunding, country n has strong incentives to be much more generous to its
domestic industries as a decrease of ǫn
t directly and fully beneﬁts the country due to
the generation of additional revenues from the sale of permits. In the system with
refunding, an increase of ǫn
t reduces aggregate and refunded revenues as the permit
price declines. Thus incentives for a country to be particularly generous to domestic
industries under refunding is greatly reduced. This lowers the sum of abatement costs
and environmental damgages at national and aggregate levels.
6.2 Participation
We next examine the willingness of countries to participate in the refunding scheme
in the ﬁrst place. A minimum requirement is that countries are not worse oﬀ with the
14refunding scheme than they would be with the decentralized solution. We start with
the homogeneous case.
Proposition 5 (Pareto Improvement without Grandfathered Permits)
If countries are homogeneous, the outcome of the game in which each country i solves
the optimization problem (33) subject to equations (9), (12), (32), (40), and αt = 1 is
always Pareto superior compared to the decentralized solution as given by Proposition
2.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in the Appendix. However, when countries are
suﬃciently heterogeneous the participation constraint for countries with low marginal
damages may be violated, as illustrated in the following example:
Suppose that





, φ1 = 0 ,φ2 = Φ, β1 = B ,β2 = 0, γ = 1 . (42)
We assume T = 1.6 Thus we consider the case of a ﬂow pollutant with two countries
that exhibit identical business-as-usual emissions ei but are completely heterogeneous
with respect to their abatement cost parameters φi and their environmental damage
parameters βi. Country 1 has prohibitively high abatement costs (φ1 = 0) and suﬀers
high environmental damage (β1 = B), while country 2 has low abatement costs (φ2 = Φ)
and suﬀers no environmental damage at all (β2 = 0). According to Proposition 2, ǫi in






2 = 0 . (43)
Total costs ˆ Ki :=
βi
2 ˆ s2 +
φi









, ˆ K2 = −
B2E2Φ
2(2 + BΦ)2 . (44)







Note that condition (41) holds for both ρi. According to Proposition 4, the permit price
p⋆ and the corresponding pollution stock s⋆ of the global social optimum as given by
6In the case of a ﬂow pollutant (i.e., γ = 1) all endogenous variables take identical values at all
times t, so the time horizon T does not matter.
15Proposition 1 are supported as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In this



















2 = 0 . (46)
Comparing
￿








1 < ˆ K1
￿
, while country 2 is worse oﬀ
￿
K⋆
2 > ˆ K2
￿
. Anticipating this
result, country 2 has no incentive to agree on ρ1 = ρ2 = 1
2 and   = 0 in the ﬁrst place.
The underlying reason is that the sum of the costs saved by the refunding scheme over
and against to the decentralized solution have to be distributed in a very speciﬁc way
to ensure a permit price level as in the global social optimum. In fact, refunds are low
for countries with low abatement cost parameters (i.e., high φi), while with the decen-
tralized solution these countries can substantially beneﬁt by selling emission permits if
they also exhibit low environmental damage parameters (i.e., low βi). Therefore it may
be impossible to agree on   = 0 and ρi
t as given by equation (40) in the ﬁrst place.
7 Grandfathered Permits
In the following we show that if we allow for some grandfathered emission permits,
the refunding scheme can always implement a Pareto improvement compared to the
decentralized solution.
7.1 Equilibria with refunding
For   > 0 the permit price is given by equation (38). In order to implement the global




k=t [δ(1 − γ)]
k−t sk from equation (16) and solving for αt.





(n − 1) 
1 −  
> 1 , t = 1,...,T . (47)
As E−2Φp⋆
t > 0 by virtue of Assumption 3, αt exceeds 1. In other words, the redistribu-
tion of the revenues from the emission permits market does not suﬃce to give adequate
incentives to countries to implement the global social optimum. The best the CA can
do to implement a permit price as close as possible to the socially optimal permit price
16p⋆
t in each period is to fully distribute the revenues among the countries by setting




























k−t sk . (48b)
Thus the resulting permit price pt is larger, the smaller the fraction   of grandfathered
permits is. Comparing equation (48b) with the corresponding equations for the social
global optimum (16) and the decentralized solution (24), we see that the upper limit
is equal to the permit price in the social global optimum p⋆
t achieved for   = 0 (see the
case without grandfathered emissions). The lower limit is reached for   = 1, where pt
equals the permit price in the decentralized solution ˆ pt.
To support the permit price pt given by equation (48b) as the unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, condition (36) has to hold. For αt = 1, condition (36) reduces to





− 2  , i = 1,...,n , t = 1,...,T . (49)
We obtain
Proposition 6 (Refunding with Grandfathered Permits)
For αt = 1 and   ∈ (0,1) and ρi
t such that condition (49) and ǫi
t ≥ 0 hold, there exists a
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium characterized by the solution of the following



























































t−k(E − Φ˜ pk) . (50c)
In addition, the following inequalities hold for the permit price ˜ pt and the pollution
stock ˜ st:





< 0 , s
⋆ < ˜ st < ˆ st ,
∂˜ st
∂ 
> 0 , t = 1,...,T , (51)
17where (p⋆,s⋆) and (ˆ p, ˆ s) denote the outcome in the social global optimum and the de-
centralized solution respectively, as given by Propositions 1 and 2.
For γ = 1 we obtain
˜ pt =
n¯ βE
1 + (n − 1)  + n¯ βΦ
, ˜ st =
E[1 + (n − 1) ]
1 + (n − 1)  + n¯ βΦ
, t = 1,...,T . (52)
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 says that if a fraction   > 0 of emission permits is grandfathered, the
distribution of the permit market revenues results in permit price levels that are above
the corresponding levels in the decentralized solution but below the corresponding levels
of the social global optimum. The opposite ranking obtains for the pollution stock. The
following corollary shows that Proposition 4 is a special case of Proposition 6.
Corollary 2 (Approximation Result)
For suﬃciently small  , the global social optimum as given by Proposition 1 can be
approximated arbitrarily close, if condition (41) as given by Proposition 4 holds for the










E − 2Φ˜ pt
, i = 1,...,n , t = 1,...,T . (53)
The proof of Corollary 2 is given in the Appendix.
7.2 Pareto improving refunding schemes
While refunding with grandfathered permits can no longer implement the global social
optimum, it makes it possible to construct schemes for ensuring that all countries are
better oﬀ compared to the decentralized solution. The following proposition states our
main possibility theorem:
Proposition 7 (Pareto Improvement with Grandfathered Permits)




t = 1 such that the resulting outcome (˜ pt,˜ ǫt, ˜ st) as given by equations (50) is
Pareto superior compared to the decentralized solution as given by Proposition 2.
The proof of Proposition 7 is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 states that as long as Assumptions 1–3 hold it is always possible to
implement an outcome that is Pareto superior to the decentralized solution via the
18refunding scheme, no matter how heterogeneous countries are.
The intuition for this result is as follows: Auctioning of permits and refunding of rev-
enues incurs less aggregate total costs measured as the sum of aggregate abatement
costs and aggregate environmental damages. By choosing an appropriate set of refund-
ing shares ρi
t one can ensure that all countries beneﬁt from this cost reduction. Finally,
allowing for a certain amount of grandfathered permits we can assure that countries
will not issue more permits than business-as-usual emissions and that the scheme will
induce a subgame perfect equilibrium.
To illustrate how a Pareto improvement can be engineered, we again consider the
example discussed in Section 6.2, for which the social global optimum could not be















n − ¯ β [ρi(1 −  ) +  ]
¯ β
!
, i = 1,2 , (54)
where (˜ p, ˜ s) are given by equation (52). To ensure that country 2 is not worse oﬀ in
comparison with the decentralized solution, we set ˆ K2 − ˜ K2 = 0 and solve for ρ2
ρ
2 =
5 −   + 2BΦ(3 + BΦ)
2(2 + BΦ)2 . (55)
Setting ρ1 = 1−ρ2 and taking into account that Assumption 3 implies BΦ ∈ (0,1), we
can verify that condition (49) holds for all   ∈ (0,1). In addition, we derive for ˜ ǫi
˜ ǫ
1 =
[4BΦ  + (1 +  )B2Φ2 − (1 −  )2]E
2 (2 + BΦ)2 , (56a)
˜ ǫ
2 =
(1 −  )(1 +   − BΦ)[(1 + BΦ)2 −  ]E
2 (1 +   + BΦ)(2 + BΦ)2 . (56b)
We observe that ˜ ǫ2 > 0 for all   ∈ (0,1). We seek the minimal   ∈ (0,1) for which









BΦ{16 + BΦ[24 + BΦ(8 + BΦ)]}
￿
. (57)
  is a decreasing function of BΦ with   = 0 for BΦ = 1 and   = 1 for BΦ = 0. Hence
we can choose a suitable value of   to ensure that both countries are better oﬀ.
Table 1 gives the results for diﬀerent values of BΦ. The decentralized solution (ˆ p, ˆ s)
and the Pareto superior solution with refunding (˜ p, ˜ s) are given as percentages of the
19corresponding values in the global social optimum. ∆ ˆ K and ∆ ˜ K measure the relative
increase in total cost compared to the global social optimum.  , ρ1 and ρ2 are the
characteristic parameters of the refunding system.
BΦ (ˆ p, ˆ s) ∆ ˆ K (˜ p, ˜ s) ∆ ˜ K   ρ1 ρ2
0.1 (52.4,104.8) 2.27 (67.7,103.2) 1.04 52.5 42.2 57.8
0.25 (55.6,111.1) 4.94 (78.4,105.4) 1.17 34.5 38.0 62.0
0.5 (60.0,120.0) 8.0 (89.0,105.5) 0.60 18.5 33.5 66.5
0.75 (63.6,127.3) 9.92 (95.6,103.3) 0.14 8.0 30.3 69.7
0.9 (65.5,131.0) 10.7 (98.5,101.4) 0.02 3.0 28.7 71.3
Table 1: Numerical values for the decentralized solution and the refunding scheme for
diﬀerent values of BΦ as percentages of the corresponding values in the social global
optimum.
8 Discussion
Within the formal representation of our model we have shown that an international
permit market with refunding can implement a Pareto superior solution compared
to a standard international permit market. Our formal results rest on a number of
assumptions, some of which we shall discuss in the following.
First, we have assumed a central agency that decides on the fraction of auction revenues
αt refunded to member countries. As we have seen, in each period the permit price is
as close as possible to the permit price in the global social optimum if αt = 1. Thus it
is possible to set αt = 1 in the initial step when governments negotiate the parameters
of the refunding scheme. This leaves the CA with the purely administrative task of
ensuring the successful operation of the international permit market. Denying any
decision-making power to the CA will prevent member countries from continuously
trying to inﬂuence the CA’s decision on αt.
Second, with respect to participation we have assumed a standard international permit
market without refunding as the status-quo scenario. However, as the EU emission
trading scheme is the ﬁrst – and so far the only – international permit market for
greenhouse gas emissions, the status-quo scenario outside the EU is a decentralized
solution where each country reduces greenhouse gas emissions on a purely national
scale, e.g., by levying emission taxes. Such a decentralized solution falls short of a
20standard international emission permit market as eﬃciency gains cannot be utilized
when countries exhibit diﬀerent marginal abatement costs. Thus enacting a permit
market scheme with refunding in this case yields even larger Pareto improvements.
Although we consider Pareto superiority a minimum requirement for member countries
to agree on an international trading scheme with refunding, it is not necessarily suﬃ-
cient. Equity considerations may play a crucial role in the negotiation of international
agreements. Although the discussion of the political economy of international agree-
ments lies beyond the scope of this paper, we note that a possible tension does exist
between eﬃciency and equity. On standard emission permit markets, countries with
low environmental damages are net sellers of emission permits. In the trading scheme
with refunding, these countries have to receive above-average refunds to compensate
them for their lost permit revenues. Thus, to implement Pareto improvements, coun-
tries with low environmental damages receive high refunds, while countries that suﬀer
strongly from climate change receive fewer refunds.
Third, unlike most of the game-theoretical literature on international environmental
agreements, we have not imposed the property of no-exit. The underlying reason is
that our model is inspired by the EU emission trading scheme. Within a supranational
authority such as the EU, the unilateral exit of individual countries is hampered, as
the EU has the power to force countries to participate in the scheme.
For international permit markets with refunding that extend to countries outside the
EU, there are two possible types of exit. First, a country may decide not to participate
in the refunding scheme but to trade permits on the permit market. This exit option
can be avoided by restricting access to the emission permit market to members of the
refunding scheme. Second, a country may decide not to participate in the refunding
scheme and to restrict environmental policy to its own jurisdiction, thereby beneﬁting
from the emission reductions of the member countries of the refunding scheme. Such
individual defection may be advantageous for countries with high abatement costs. In
order to avoid this type of exit, one might levy entry fees increasing the level of the
fund so that countries lose larger claims on refunds if they exit.7
Numerous extensions deserve further scrutiny. For instance, it might be useful to ex-
plore the potential and limits of a refunding scheme where governments can only agree
on formal equality, i.e., each country obtains the same fraction of auction revenues.
7Gersbach and Winkler (2007) show how exit can be avoided with entry fees when countries levy
emission taxes.
21This might be particularly relevant when local abatement costs or local environmental
damages are the private information of member countries. Moreover, it might be useful
to consider a scenario where countries negotiate that only a fraction of auction revenues
will be refunded in order to build up a fund that can be used for preventive measures
lowering environmental damages in particular countries.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a simple blueprint for an international emission market
with refunding that helps to align national and global interests on emission reduc-
tions. We have shown that an international permit market with refunding can imple-
ment a Pareto superior solution compared to a standard international permit market.
Moreover, if the share of grandfathered permits is suﬃciently small and countries are
suﬃciently homogeneous, an arbitrarily close approximation to the socially optimal
solution can be achieved.
22Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
By inserting equation (12) into equation (16) we obtain a linear system of T equations
(17a) with full rank. Thus there exists a unique solution for the T unknowns p⋆
t (t =
1,...,T). Inserting the resulting p⋆
t into equation (12) yields equation (17b). Equations
(18) follow by inserting γ = 1 into equations (17). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
By inserting equation (12) into equation (24) we derive a linear system of T equations
(27a) with full rank. Thus there exists a unique solution for the T unknowns ˆ pt (t =
1,...,T). Inserting the resulting ˆ pt into equation (25) and (12) yields equations (27b)
and (27c). Equations (28) follow by inserting γ = 1 into equations (27). ￿
Proof of Proposition 3
The Lagrangian (34) is convex if and only if its Hessian is positive semi-deﬁnite. A
matrix is positive semi-deﬁnite if all eigenvalues are non-negative. The Hessian of the
Lagrangian (34) is a diagonal matrix, as ∂2L
∂ǫi
tst′ = 0 for all i = 1,...,n and t,t′ =






























t−1βi > 0 . (A.1b)
The right-hand side of equation (A.1a) is non-negative if and only if condition (36)
holds. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4
For αt = 1 and ρi
t given by equation (40), the socially optimal permit prices p⋆
t and pol-
lution stocks s⋆
t as given by Proposition 1 are a candidate for a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, as they solve the necessary condition (39a). However, if the Lagrangian
(34) is jointly convex in all ǫi
t and st, then equation (39a) is also suﬃcient for a unique
solution. Condition (41) follows directly from condition (36) of Proposition 3 by insert-
ing   = 0 and αt = 1. ￿
23Proof of Corollary 1
According to equation (40), homogeneous countries imply that ρi
t =
1
n (i = 1,...,n; t =
1,...,t). For this set of ρi
t condition (41) holds. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5
When   = 0 and all countries are homogeneous, the conditions for Proposition 4
hold, hence the global social optimum is supported as a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. The sum of the total costs of all countries in the global social optimum











is smaller than the sum of the total










construction p⋆ and s⋆ are the unique minimizers of the sum of total costs. As countries
are homogeneous, the total costs of all countries are identical and equal 1
n of the sum
of total costs. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6
By inserting equation (12) into equation (48a) we obtain the linear system of T equa-
tions (50a) for the T unknowns ˜ pt (t = 1,...,T). Inserting the resulting ˆ pt into equation









pt [ (n+1)+2(1− )−1] , (A.2)
Equation (50b) is derived by inserting (A.2) into equation (48a). The solution deter-
mined by equations (50) is a candidate for the Nash equilibrium as it is consistent with
the necessary conditions (48a). If, in addition,   ∈ (0,1) and ρi
t are such that condition
(49) and ǫi
t ≥ 0 for all i = 1,...,n and t = 1,...,T hold, the necessary conditions
are also suﬃcient for the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Conditions (51)
directly follow from equation (48b). Equations (52) are derived by inserting γ = 1 into
equations (50). ￿
Proof of Corollary 2
We insert ρi
t from equation (53) into equation (50b) and observe that ˜ ǫi
t ≥ 0 (i =
1,...,n; t = 1,...,T) by virtue of Assumption 2. As condition (41) imposes tighter
constraints on the magnitude of the refunding shares than condition (49), the require-
ments for Proposition 6 are fulﬁlled. We next observe that lim →0 ˜ pt = p⋆
t. Thus, for
suﬃciently small   abatement eﬀorts, emission levels and environmental damages are
arbitrarily close to their socially optimal values. To sum up, for suﬃciently small  ,
24the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 6 is arbitrarily close to
the global social optimum. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7




t = 1 holds, it
is possible to ﬁnd a   ∈ (0,1) for which the the resulting outcome (˜ pt,˜ ǫt, ˜ st) as given
by equations (50) can be supported as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
According to Proposition 6, for this to hold we have to satisfy condition (49) and to
ensure that all ǫi
t ≥ 0. We observe that for   suﬃciently close to 1 condition (49)
holds for all i = 1,...,n for any distribution of ρi








by virtue of Assumption 2 also all ǫi
t ≥ 0 for any distribution of ρi
t if   is suﬃciently
close to 1. For any   ∈ (0,1) and the corresponding outcome (˜ pt,˜ ǫt, ˜ st) the sum of the










is smaller than the sum of total costs in the









. This holds as the total costs are
strictly convex in pt, st and exhibit their minimum at p⋆
t, s⋆, as seen in Section 4. As
a consequence, it is always possible to choose the refunding shares ρi
t so that nobody
is worse oﬀ and at least one country is strictly better oﬀ than in the decentralized
solution. ￿
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